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Abstract
An important source of trade with time zone differences is related to
the “coincidence in time” aspect of service transactions. Trade across
different time zones is gainful when fulfilling nighttime demand in one
time zone by utilizing daytime supply in another time zone. This note
emphasizes that, due to communications revolutions, new versions of
periodic intra-industry trade based on the differences in time zones
emerge.
JEL classification: F12
Keywords: Communications Nteworks; Time Zone Differences; Peri-
odic Intra-Industry Trade
2
1 Introduction
Service transactions are often characterized by the requirement that there be
a double coincidence in both time and space of the proximity of the buyer to
the seller.1 The nonstorable nature of services implies that production and
consumption tend to occur at the same time and in the same location.
However, the new types of communications networks (e.g., the Internet),
at reasonably low cost, break the necessity for the buyer and the seller to
be in the same location, even though the coincidence in time may not be
broken.2 It also creates opportunities to take advantage of differences in
time zones. Usually, time zone differences add significantly to the costs of
doing business across countries and have a negative impact on world trade
flows.3 Still, for some kinds of service transactions, the practice of spreading
work across different time zones enables more efficient production. In a recent
contribution, Marjit (2007) argues for the inclusion of time zone differences
as a determinant of trade patterns.4
1Hill (1977).
2Harris (1998). Related to this, Long, Riezman and Soubeyran (2005) discuss the link
between services provision and fragmentation.
3According to this point, Stein and Daude (2007) consider time differences in the
context of the location of foreign direct investment. They found that transaction costs
associated with time zone differences are important for frequent real-time communications
between headquarters and their affiliates.
4Jones, Kierkowzki and Lurong (2005) and Kikuchi (2009) also emphasize the role of
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An important source of trade with time zone differences is related to the
“coincidence in time” aspect of service transactions. Trade across different
time zones is gainful when fulfilling nighttime demand in one time zone by uti-
lizing daytime supply in another time zone. In general, nighttime wage rates
are higher than daytime wage rates. Thus, the utilization of communications
devices makes it possible to take advantage of not only the international wage
rate differences but also daytime/nighttime wage rate differences.
It is important to note that these kinds of service trade can be interpreted
as new versions of periodic intra-industry trade.5 Traditionally, trade in (per-
ishable) agricultural products, electricity and similar goods has been based
on predictable, periodic fluctuations in countries’ production of, or demand
for, these commodities. As for agricultural products, for example, the cycle
is seasonal, based on the differences in climatic zones. This note emphasizes
that, due to communications revolutions, similar kinds of trade based on the
differences in time zones emerge.
The next section presents the basic model. In section 3, the impact of
technological advance in communications networks is examined. Section 4
presents concluding remarks.
different time zones.
5Grubel and Lloyd (1975).
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2 The Model
Suppose that there are two countries, Home and Foreign. They are located
in different time zones and there is no overlap in daily work hours: when
Home’s daytime work hours end, Foreign daytime work hours begin (Figure
1). Except for differences in time zones, these two countries are identical.
In this section we concentrate on what happens in the Home market in the
absence of international trade.
We assume that the distribution of consumers is uniform along a line of
unit length z ∈ [0, 1], and with no loss of generality, we normalize the total
mass of Home consumers to equal 1. Each consumer is endowed with the
amount E of income to be spent on differentiated services.
There are two competing categories of services: daytime services, which
are provided by hiring daytime labor, and nighttime services, which are pro-
vided by hiring nighttime labor. A variety of differentiated services can be
produced within either category. Each consumer is assumed to purchase
services from only one category (daytime or nighttime). The utility of con-
sumers is assumed to be increasing in the variety of complementary services
available in a particular category. We define the utility of an individual of
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type z by
U(z) = (1− z)CD if the individual chooses daytime services, and
U(z) = zCN if the individual chooses nighttime services, (1)
where CD (CN) is the quantity index of daytime (nighttime) services. A
higher z indicates a consumer with a stronger preference towards nighttime
services (Figure 2).6 Quantity indices are defined in the Dixit-Stiglitz form
Ck =
 mk∑
i=1
(cki )
σ−1
σ
 σσ−1 , k = D, N, (2)
where mD (mN) is the number of daytime (nighttime) services and σ > 2 is
the elasticity of substitution between every pair of products within the same
category. Price indices for each group of products, which indicate the cost of
increasing the quantity index by one unit, are defined as follows:
P k =
 mk∑
i=1
(pki )
1−σ
 11−σ = (mk) 11−σ pk, k = D, N. (3)
Let us turn to the cost structure of differentiated services. In each group,
differentiated services are provided by monopolistically competitive firms.
One of the central assumptions is that each firm must be established and
managed by an entrepreneur. We assume that there are M entrepreneurs in
6Note that the line in Figure 2 represents consumers’ preferences toward each type of
service and does not represent their working hours.
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Home:
mD +mN =M.
Each entrepreneur has to decide what type of services to provide. There are
two options: (1) hire Home daytime labor at wage rate wD and provide a
daytime service; or (2) hire Home nighttime labor at wage rate wN and pro-
vide a nighttime service. To establish intra-day wage differences, we impose
the following condition:
wD < wN . (4)
We treat these wage rates as exogenous.
In order to simplify the analysis, we assume that the production of one
unit of any service requires one unit of labor. Given a Dixit-Stiglitz specifi-
cation with constant elasticity σ and a wage rate wk (k = D, N), each firm
in category k sets its price pk as
pk =
σwk
σ − 1 , k = D, N. (5)
From (4), the following holds:
pD < pN . (6)
That is, due to intra-day wage differences, nighttime services are more ex-
pensive than daytime services. Then the operating profit of each type of
service firm becomes:
pik =
wkxk
σ − 1 , k = D, N. (7)
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In the long run, there is no incentive for entrepreneurs to move from one
category to another. Therefore, piD = piN holds, and from (7), we can obtain
the following condition:
wDxD = wNxN . (8)
Let us denote the number of consumers who purchase daytime services
as zˆ. Given zˆ, we can obtain the relative number of each category of services
as follows:
mD
mN
=
zˆ
1− zˆ . (9)
Now turn to the equilibrium number of consumers who purchase day-
time/nighttime services. Using (1), zˆ is derived as
zˆ =
1
1 +
(
PD
PN
) = 1
1 +
(
mD
mN
)1/(1−σ) (
wD
wN
) . (10)
Substituting (9) into (10), one can obtain the equilibrium proportion of con-
sumers who purchase daytime services:
zˆ
1− zˆ =
(
wD
wN
)−σ−1
σ−2
. (11)
Combining (11) with (4), one can obtain an interesting result regarding the
equilibrium share of daytime services without trade.
Proposition 1: The equilibrium share of consumers who purchase daytime
services is negatively related to the wage premium for the night shift.
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It is important to note that Proposition 1 is closely related to the concept of
“indirect network effects” in the IO literature.7 Since the prices of nighttime
services are higher than those of daytime services, ceteris paribus, consumers
prefer to purchase a daytime services bundle, which further reduces the mar-
ket size for nighttime services.
3 The Impact of Technological Advances in
Communications Networks
Now let us consider the impact of technological advances in communications
networks. In our scenario, daytime (resp. nighttime) service firms in one
country can provide (export) their services as nighttime (resp. daytime) ser-
vices for the other country. Consumers can purchase both domestic services
and imported services. Note that, at nighttime, if one country imports ser-
vices which utilize the other country’s daytime labor, the price of imported
services is lower than the price of domestic nighttime services. This increases
the attractiveness of a bundle of nighttime services.
In this case, Home’s price indices for daytime/nighttime services become
P˜D = (m˜D)
1
1−σ pD + (m˜∗N)
1
1−σ p∗N , (12)
P˜N = (m˜N)
1
1−σ pN + (m˜∗D)
1
1−σ p∗D, (13)
7Chou and Shy (1990).
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where “∼” indicates a trading equilibrium value and “∗” indicates values for
Foreign.
Using (10), (12) and (13), one can obtain the condition for the equilibrium
number of consumers who purchase daytime/nighttime services:
z˜ =
1
1 +
(
P˜D
P˜N
) = 1
1 +
(
(m˜D)
1
1−σ pD+(m˜∗N )
1
1−σ p∗N
(m˜N )
1
1−σ pN+(m˜∗D)
1
1−σ p∗D
) . (14)
From the pricing condition (5), it is clear that pD = p∗D and pN = p∗N . Also,
since these two countries are completely identical (except for time zones),
there is symmetry in the trading equilibrium:
m˜D
m˜N
=
m˜∗D
m˜∗N
. (15)
Substituting (15) into (14), one can obtain z˜:
z˜ =
1
2
. (16)
Combining this with (9), the equilibrium number of each type of services can
be obtained as follows:
m˜D
m˜N
=
m˜∗D
m˜∗N
= 1. (17)
Proposition 2: In the trading equilibrium, half of the consumers purchase
daytime services while the other half purchases nighttime services.
As already noted, via trade liberalization (i.e., utilization of both com-
munications networks and time zone differences), the relative attractiveness
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of a bundle of nighttime services becomes higher. So, some consumers begin
to switch from purchasing daytime services to purchasing nighttime services:
zˆ decreases (Figure 2). From the entrepreneurs’ perspective, this change
implies an increase in the market size for nighttime services. Thus, some
entrepreneurs begin to move from the daytime service sector toward the
nighttime service sector: m˜N > mN .
It is important to note that, because of product differentiation, intra-
industry trade in services occurs (Figure 3). For example, during Home’s
daytime (i.e., Foreign’s nighttime), consumers in each country purchase both
countries’ services: Home daytime services and Foreign nighttime services.
Since Home service providers have a cost advantage over their Foreign com-
petitors (wD < w∗N), Home becomes a net exporter of service during its day-
time. On the other hand, during Home’s nighttime (i.e., Foreign’s daytime),
Foreign becomes a net exporter of services. Thus, due to communications
breakthroughs, periodic intra-industry trade occurs across countries.
4 Concluding Remarks
This study highlights the role of cross-border communications benefiting
from time zone differentials as a driving force behind trade in services. It is
shown that, by utilizing both communications networks and time zone differ-
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ences, some entrepreneurs in one country change from being daytime service
providers to being nighttime service providers.
Although these results are derived under the assumption that two coun-
tries are identical except for differences in time zones, it appears that some-
thing similar to this will occur in more general settings. The present analysis
must be regarded as very tentative. Hopefully, it provides a useful paradigm
for the consideration of how time zone differences work as a driving force for
international trade.
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